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Thomas S. Kuhn is best-known for The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, originally published 
in 1962, in which he proposed his influential model of scientific change.  However, 
contemporary Kuhn scholarship no longer focuses exclusively on Structure.  Kuhn continued 
to develop the details of his approach to science for more than thirty years following its original 
publication.  It is now widely recognized that Kuhn’s later work contains significant 
refinements of the ideas initially proposed in Structure.  But it is not just that contemporary 
Kuhn scholarship is informed by the later development of Kuhn’s ideas.  It is also increasingly 
informed by an awareness of the earlier development of Kuhn’s thought prior to the original 
publication of Structure.  This is not just a matter of considering Kuhn’s publications prior to 
Structure.  It is also a matter of access to significant archival materials, including Kuhn’s course 
notes, unpublished lectures, and correspondence. 
 The present volume is a contribution to contemporary Kuhn scholarship in the sense 
just described.  The editor, Brad Wray, has assembled a dozen papers which represent various 
aspects of contemporary scholarly approaches to Kuhn.  The volume opens with an 
introductory essay by Wray, which offers general remarks about the state of Kuhn scholarship 
and introduces the subject matter of the papers contained in the volume.  The volume is divided 
into three parts.  I follow this organizational structure in summarizing the contents of the 
volume before offering critical commentary. 
 The first part of the volume is entitled ‘Foundational Issues’.  It opens with a paper by 
Paul Hoyningen-Huene, which presents a genealogical analysis of Kuhn’s metaphysics.   
Hoyningen-Huene traces Kuhn’s idealist-tending metaphysics back, by way of twentieth 
century physics, Kant, primary and secondary qualities to “the fundamentally disruptive insight 
of Copernicanism … that real, objective, causally efficacious phenomena that appear to be 
purely object-sided are not necessarily purely object-sided, because they may contain 
genetically subject-sided components” (p. 14).  A somewhat different genealogy emerges in 
the next chapter by Lydia Patton.  Patton points to the influence of philosophers who were on 
the scene at Harvard during Kuhn’s student years, such as C. I. Lewis and Raphael Demos, 
among others.  She also emphasizes Kuhn’s reading of the psychologist Jean Piaget on concept 
acquisition in children.  In his contribution, George Reisch contrasts Kuhn’s apolitical 
conception of science with the engaged approach of James Bryant Conant, who gave Kuhn’s 
career its start by inviting him to teach in the Harvard general education program.  Where 
Conant advocated a positive role for science in a democratic society, Kuhn understood normal 
science to operate in isolation from external influences.  In the final piece in the section, J. C. 
Pinto de Oliveira considers the traditional “image of science” against which Kuhn opposed the 
approach presented in Structure.  Pinto de Oliveira articulates assumptions made by logical 
positivism relating to cumulative progress in science, which suggest that the traditional image 
was shared by the positivists.  He draws on early manuscripts of Structure to show that Kuhn 
had in mind a contrast with an image of art as non-cumulative, a contrast which Kuhn sought 
to dispel with the alternative image of science that he presented. 
 The second part of the volume is ‘Three Core Concepts’.  William Goodwin provides 
a detailed analysis of normal science and puzzle-solving, taking off from Kuhn’s claim that 
normal science consists in large part of “mop-up work”.  Kuhn’s idea of extraordinary or 
revolutionary science has often captured attention.  Goodwin argues that for Kuhn science must 
be understood in “two-point perspective”, which involves both extraordinary and normal 
phases of scientific research (p. 103).  William J. Devlin makes standard distinctions between 
forms of Kuhnian incommensurability and develops interesting implications of 
incommensurability with respect to the correspondence theory of truth.  He brings Kuhn’s later 
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thinking about lexicons and local incommensurability into fruitful contact with a distinction 
made by Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka between language as universal medium and language as 
calculus.  In his contribution, Eric Scerri focuses on a suggestion by Brad Wray that the shift 
from identifying chemical elements by atomic weight to identifying them by atomic number 
constituted a classic Kuhnian revolution.  Scerri casts doubt on whether this shift conforms to 
Kuhn’s characterization of a revolution either as originally presented in Structure or as Kuhn 
later presented it in terms of change in lexical structure and the no-overlap principle. 
 The third part is ‘Kuhnian Themes’.  In a fascinating historical study, Peter Barker 
shows how more recent scholarship, especially on Islamic astronomy, reveals a very different 
picture from Kuhn’s view of the Copernican revolution.  Barker ultimately concludes that, 
Copernicus’s work was not in fact revolutionary, though it did inaugurate a crisis which, only 
after Newton, gave rise to a new paradigm.  For her part, Vasso Kindi addresses Kuhn’s use of 
Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit image.  On the one hand, Kuhn uses the image to characterize the 
way in which scientists perceive the world through the lens of the paradigm within which they 
operate.  On the other hand, he used the image to get across the way in which a scientist’s shift 
between paradigms involves a holistic alteration of their entire theoretical outlook.  In his 
contribution, Thomas Nickles turns to Kuhn’s treatment of scientific discovery.  Kuhn 
proposed an “endogenous” account of discovery as stemming from the processes of normal 
scientific puzzle-solving activity.  But, Nickles argues, Kuhn fails to fully “endogenize” 
discovery, since he is unable to provide an account of the origin of the “founding exemplars” 
(p. 191) that form the basis of the new normal science that emerges after a revolution.  Jouni-
Matti Kuukkanen considers Kuhn’s evolutionary conception of scientific development.  Kuhn 
rejects the idea that the progress of science consists in convergence on the one true theory of 
the world in favour of an evolutionary conception of progress as movement away from a 
primitive starting-point.  Because of the way in which Kuhn sees science and the world as co-
evolving, Kuukkanen argues, a standard realist conception of truth as correspondence to a fixed 
reality must be rejected within a Kuhnian framework.  Finally, in the last chapter of the volume, 
the editor himself, Brad Wray explores the opposition between monism and pluralism in 
relation to Kuhn’s view of science.  Kuhn emphasized the role of basic consensus on paradigm 
for the proper functioning of normal science.  Such a monistic view of normal science is in 
tension with a recent tendency in the history and philosophy of science to emphasize the 
plurality of scientific practices.  Wray seeks to reconcile monistic elements of Kuhn’s view 
with the idea that science is characterized by a plurality of “systems of practices” (p. 227).   
 I turn now from summary to appraisal.  There is much that is good about this volume, 
as well as a worry.  To accentuate the positive, I begin with the good.  The essays in this volume 
are a clear demonstration of the maturity of the scholarship that is now characteristic of what 
might be called “Kuhn studies”.  The essays are grounded in a thorough and sophisticated 
understanding of Kuhn.  Considerable care has been invested in detailed articulation and 
analysis of a range of themes that emerge in Kuhn’s work.  The level at which the volume is 
pitched makes it unsuited for a reader with no prior knowledge of Kuhn.  But the essays are so 
well-written and presented that the generalist reader with basic familiarity with Kuhn may 
benefit from study of the volume.  The specialist reader will find much that is of interest, though 
perhaps little that breaks genuinely new ground. 
 As for the worry, I note that the sub-title of the volume is “Critical Essays”.  But 
criticism of Kuhn is just what is lacking.  There is, of course, passing reference to early critics, 
such as Popper, Scheffler and Shapere.  There is, as well, detailed discussion that might be 
described as “internal critique”.  An example is Nickles’ point that Kuhn’s account of discovery 
fails to be fully endogenous due to the origin of exemplars.  Another example is Scerri’s  
objection to Wray’s Kuhnian treatment of the shift from atomic weight to number.  But there 
is a sense that the contributors to the present volume, for the most part, take the critics of Kuhn 
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to have been satisfactorily answered in previous literature.  They may now be set aside and 
safely ignored.  Incommensurability is real.  Correspondence truth is not.  Idealism is post-
Copernican.  Realism is pre-Copernican.  To put a positive spin on this, one might say that the 
area of Kuhn studies has matured into normal science that concentrates on puzzles without the 
distraction of debate over fundamentals.  The worry is that it is more akin to a cult.  Kuhn-
devotees ignore past criticism and press ahead with the study of their founding figure.  Charity 
suggests we adopt the positive spin.  In less charitable moments, the worry remains.  As with 
Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit, the book may be seen in two opposing ways – but not at the same 
time. 
 
